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ABSTRACT
THE EXPOSITION OF RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL SYMBOLS ACCORDING 
TO THE POLITICAL EUROPEAN SYSTEM. THE CASE OF LAUTSI VERSUS 
ITALY AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
On 3rd November 2009 the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg ruled that Italy had to 
remove cruciﬁ xes from school classrooms, thereby supporting the application submitted by Soile 
Lautsi Albertin, an Italian citizen of Finnish origin, “in the name of the principle of state secular-
ism.” The above decision sparked an uproar and criticism which reverberated throughout entire 
Europe.
On 30th June 2010, an appeal against this ruling, inspired by an ideological vision of religious 
freedom, had been discussed by Italian government lawyers before the Grand Chambre of the Court 
of Justice in Strasbourg.
The Appeal judgment cancelled the ﬁ rst verdict and recognized the Italian Government’s rea-
sons and rights to display cruciﬁ xes in public schools. It was concluded that the ﬁ rst judgment 
didn’t take into consideration the social and public role of religion, especially the Christian one, in 
the process of building a civil society and a public law system and promoted religious indifferent-
ism which stands in contradiction with the entire history, culture and rights of the Italian people and 
the peoples of Europe. 
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In Strasbourg, on 3th November 2009, with a trial that sparked criticism through-
out Europe – the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Italy had to remove the 
cruciﬁ x from the public school classrooms, allowing the application submitted by 
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Mme Soile Lautsi Albertin, an Italian citizen of Finnish origin, “in the name of the 
principle of state secularism.”
A short-sighted judgment in terms of ethical assumptions that each State based on 
principles of democracy and rule of law is called to uphold and promote the beneﬁ t 
of its citizens: just for these reasons this judgment was subject of criticism by several 
institutional organizations and by civil society in Italy and Europe.
On 30th June 2010, the Grand Chambre of the Court of Justice in Strasbourg has 
discussed an Appeal by the Italian Government against that ruling inspired by an 
ideological vision of religious freedom.
The Appeal judgement cancelled the ﬁ rst sentence and recognized the reasons of 
the Italian Government and the right to display cruciﬁ xes in public schools. 
I have been member of the staff of lawyers who followed the debate preparation 
of the Italian Goverment application.
As evidence of the legitimacy of the reasons of the Appeal presented by the Ital-
ian Government is well noted that a dozen European Countries have formed the third 
side of the same Italian Government, to request cancellation of the Court’s ruling 
against cruciﬁ x.
Among these Countries there were States with great religious traditions, Catholic 
and Orthodox, as Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta, Russia and 
San Marino.
It is not an accident that unfortunately great absents in this trial at the European 
Court of Justice were the Western States where the cultural secularist, relativistic 
politcal drift overcomes the civil society: France, Germany, Great Britain. 
We make some general observations on the delicate subject matter of the Appeal 
by the Italian Government; according to all jurists and lawyers involved in the judg-
ment Lautsi versus Italie what was at stake was the most important right of freedom 
of choice for every citizen, the freedom of religion and its events in public places.
We cannot forget that the Court of Justice on Human Rights is an institution of the 
Council of Europe and not of the European Union.
The Council of Europe is an international organization that brings together several 
Countries outside the EU, and their outlines are often at odds with the fundamental 
principles of the Aquis Communautaire about the subject of religious freedom: this 
is the case of Turkey, that behind the shape of the secularist State maintains de facto 
Muslim religion as State religion, and discriminates every other manifestation of 
faith in civil society: the Catholic Church for example in Turkey cannot promote any 
charitable, educational, social institutions, because cannot obtain legal personality.
I think we can say that this sentence is the result of the work of a Court sought to 
deny the meaning of the project of Europe cultural uniﬁ cation thought by the found-
ing fathers Alcide De Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer, Schuman.
The sentence of the Strasbourg Court is a classic example of a secular setting 
time to lock the manifestation of freedom of religion, especially Christianity, in a real 
ghetto. In this perspective we can explain the framework of the written judgment, 
whereby the exposure of any religious symbol violates the rights of parental choice 
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on how to educate children, the rights of children of believing or not, and violates the 
“educational pluralism.”1
The judgment of the Court was patently illogical. The judgment doesn’t appreci-
ate the social and public role of religion, especially Christianity, in the construction 
of civil society and public law and promotes religious indifferentism which is in 
contradiction with the history, culture and the right of the Italian people and peoples 
of Europe: a manifestation of aggressive secularism ﬁ ghting religious freedom is 
objectively revealed in the Judgment Lautsi.
We know that the cruciﬁ x is a symbol of religious and cultural identity and as such 
it has never taken a coercive value, as alleged by the Court in its judgment.
As witnessed earlier decisions made by judges in Italy, the cruciﬁ x is an element 
of public identity based on values and ethical assumptions underlying the Constitu-
tion of our Country, in a society that can not be separated from its Christian tradition 
recognized and promoted even in the Constitution.2
It follows that if we remove the cruciﬁ xes from schools, as public places, we 
should remove all the crosses and the magniﬁ cent sacred works that are present in our 
streets and in our squares, which is absurd.
It’s good to mention – in particular – that the Italian Constitutional system, unlike 
the French and others inspired by an abstract concept of laïcité, has always been in 
keeping with the recognition and inclusion in their law of Christian cultural identity.3
The display of cruciﬁ xes in Italian school classrooms is prior to the Republican 
Constitution, but was decided during the liberal and anticlerical age of Risorgimento 
through the Casati Law n. 3725 of 13 November 1859.
The European Court’s judgment is therefore quite abstract and does not take into 
account national contexts, the realities of individual countries.
The Italian Constitution rejects the secular and irreligious setting typical of the 
French law regulations, for which the religious factor is purely individual and is in-
tended to remain within the private sphere.
The constitutional discipline, therefore, while ensuring all the religious faiths, 
recognizes individual confessions as found in social reality.
Thus, the Constitution recognizes the equal religious freedom, but not equal treat-
ment because it aims to respect and promot the ethical values that underlie the promi-
nent beliefs of their people.4 
Avoiding any public sphere from the religious traditions means to deny the State 
role as a promoter, protector and defender of human freedom.
In the Appeal at the Council of Europe, the councel for the defence focused criti-
cism against the assessments of the Court of Justice on three fundamental issues of 
constitutional legal natur that are the basis of the judgment: the principles of neutral-
ity of the State, of negative and active secularism and the principle of subsidiarity.
ended to remain within the private sphere.
1  J. R a t z i n g e r, J. H a b e r m a s, Etica, religione e Stato liberale, Brescia 2005, p. 50.
2  F.A. Vo n  H a y e k, La società libera, Roma 1999, p. 490.
3  A. D e l  N o c e, Filosoﬁ  dell’esistenza e della libertà, Milano 1992, p. 632.
4  S. S a t t a, Colloqui e soliloqui di un giurista, Padova 1968, p. 416.
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The constitutional discipline, therefore, while ensuring all the religious faiths, 
recognizes individual confessions as found in social reality.
The American philosopher and jurist Joseph Weiler, Director of the Jean Mon-
net Centre and representing the Governments of Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, 
Lithuania, Malta, The Russian Federation and San Marino, all Third Parties in the 
Lautsi Appeal stressed the extreme danger of the concept of state neutrality in the 
legal claims of the judges of the Court of Justice: the State, because its primary task 
is to protect, promote and ensure the multiple manifestations of freedom of thought 
of the citizens, on an individual as an associate, has a responsibility to consider the 
religious factor as a constitutive pillar of social life of people – within the public 
sphere of civil and politic society.5
The Chamber also articulates the principle of “neutrality:” “The State’s duty of 
neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any kind of power on its part to assess 
the legitimacy of religious convictions or the ways of expressing those convictions.” 
This formulation of “neutrality” is based on two conceptual errors which are fatal to 
the conclusions.6
First, under the Convention system all Members must, indeed, guarantee indi-
vidual freedom of religion but also freedom from religion. This obligation represents 
a common constitutional asset of Europe. It is, however, counter balanced by con-
siderable liberty when it comes to the place of religion or religious heritage in the 
collective identity of the nation and the symbology of the State.
Thus, there are Members States in which laïcité is part of the very deﬁ nition of the 
State, such as France and in which, indeed, there can be no State endorsed or spon-
sored religious symbol in a public space. Religion is a private affair.
But no State is required under the Convention system to support laïcité. Thus, just 
across the Channel there is England in where there is an Established State Church, in 
which the Head of State is also the Head of the Church, in which religious leaders, 
are members, ex ofﬁ cio, of the legislative branch, in which the ﬂ ag carries the Cross 
and in which the National Anthem is a prayer to God to save the Monarch, and give 
him or her Victory and Glory.
There is a huge diversity of State-Church arrangement in Europe. More than half 
the population of Europe lives in States which could not be described as laïcist. Inevi-
tably in public education, the State and its symbols have a place. Many of these, how-
ever, have a religious origin or contemporary religious identity. In Europe, the Cross 
is the most visible example appearing as it does on endless ﬂ ags, crests, buildings etc. 
It is wrong to argue, as some have, that it is o n l y  or m e r e l y  a national symbol.
This European arrangement constitutes a huge lesson in pluralism and tolerance. 
Every child in Europe, atheist and religious, Christian, Muslim and Jew, learns that 
as part of their European heritage, Europe insists, on the one hand on their individual 
right to worship freely – within limits of respecting other people’s rights and public 
order – and their right not to worship at all.
5  A. P a s s e r i n  d’E n t r è v e s, La dottrina del diritto naturale, Torino 1954, p. 176–177.
6  Z. G r o c h o l e w s k i, La ﬁ losoﬁ a del diritto di Giovanni Paolo II, Roma 2002, p. 31.
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At the same time, as part of its pluralism and tolerance, Europe accepts and re-
spects a France and an England; a Sweden and a Denmark, a Greece and an Italy all 
of which have very different practices of acknowledging publically endorsed reli-
gious symbols by the State and in public spaces.
In many of these non-laicist States, large segments of the population, maybe even 
a majority are no longer religious themselves. And yet the continued entanglement of 
religious symbols in its public space and by the State is accepted by the secular popu-
lation as part of national identity and as an act of tolerance towards their co-nationals.
As said Prof. Joseph Weiler, it may be, that some day, British people, exercising 
their constitutional sovereignty, will divest themselves of the Church of England. 
But that is for them, not for an European Court judgement. Italy is free to choose to 
be laïque. The Italian people may democratically and constitutionally elect to have 
a laïque State. But the applicant, Ms Lautsi, does not want this Court to recognize the 
right of Italy to be laïque, but to impose on her a duty. That is not supported by law.
In today’s Europe Countries have opened their gates to many new residents and 
citizens.The Europe of the Convention represents a unique balance between the in-
dividual liberty of freedom of and from religion, and the collective liberty to deﬁ ne 
the State and Nation using religious symbols and even having an established Church. 
We trust our constitutional democratic institutions to deﬁ ne our public spaces and our 
collective educational system.
In this issue the principle of subsidiarity has a fundamental importance. The sub-
sidiarity, a constitutional principle of the EU Treaties cames indeed from the Social 
Doctrine of the Catholic Church, infact it was elaborated through the Enciclica Quad-
ragesimo Anno of the Holy Father Pius XI during the thrtiees years of the last centu-
ry.7 Let me say that it’s curious that very few politicians and intellectuals remember 
that Europe is indebted to the Catholic Church for this important social policy con-
cept.
The principle of subsidiarity in the EU’s treaties asks in fact that European insti-
tutions leave member states free to legislate on religious freedom of their citizens, 
without imposing authoritative decisions, but merely to harmonizing national laws 
with European ones.
The Court of Justice has instead taken an obsolete constitutional interpretation, 
inspired by the so-called “negative laicism,” a typical concept inspired by the French 
illuministic law: through the pretext of imposing the indifference of the State on 
religious issues in order to respect the diversity of faiths, in fact it prevents, discrimi-
nates, does not protect the religious freedom of expression of the majority of citizens.
I must remember that in our Italian Constitution really is not mentioned at all the 
concept of secularism.
Actually it seems that in the political-institutional program of implementation of 
European uniﬁ cation, the temptation, as is typical of Lautsi case, to give an applica-
7  L. G a l a n t i n i, La tutela delle identitculturali nel governo d’Europa: sovranite sussidiarietnel 
processo di integrazione europeo, Milano 2008, p. 47 segg.
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tion of the concept of secularism “negative” or “discriminatory” or totalitarian as in 
communist Countries.
Although the effort of the philosophes was oriented to give an injection of posi-
tive content – such as ‘freedom,’ ‘autonomy,’ ‘tolerance,’ ‘fraternity’ and more – to 
the concept of ‘secularism,’ we can not yet say that it has been crowned by actual 
success.
As previously stated one of the founders of the European Union, the statesman 
Jacques Delors, the principle of subsidiarity is rather the tool that prevents the inva-
sion of a single thought homologating the political sovereignty of civil society and 
the values that inspired, ﬁ rst of all the religious factor.
The judge of the Court of Justice in Strasbourg on behalf of Spain, Prof. Bor-
rego. Borrego has effectively shown that the Lautsi decision belongs to a virtual legal 
world which is not able to face the reality of cultural, historical, social and local herit-
age of values that characterizes the experience of European history.
A different value has the principle of “positive secularism,” which provides the 
necessary recognition of a margin of appreciation to religion, to faith as a social 
factor that rightfully should be protected and promoted in the public domain, as an 
expression of the cultural identity of a society.
Otherwise the values outlined in the Western constitutional Cards are reduced to 
a sterile exercise in style: it is good to mention the crystal clear mind of the Italian 
jurist and philosopher Passerin Entreves, that the law is not only a measure of the ac-
tion, but it is also a value judgment of the action.8 
For the law – although with certain hypocrisy some Courts of Justice trying to 
ignore the point – indicates what is good and evil: and in turn good and bad are the 
conditions that justify a legal obligation.
We must recognize that the religious phenomenon, and in particular the Christian 
heritage of the West is a primary and essential value even at the political level, that 
remains so despite the opposition.
It is necessary, in particular, to limit the growing judicial activism of law-courts 
that are increasingly looking to replace the law purporting to interpret it, trying not to 
recognize to the various States a margin of appreciation – recognized linked to issues 
of national values and roots that underpin the social pact of coexistence of a nation.
The issue of religious freedom concerns the European Union as a supranational 
institution such as democratic organization, and can not discriminate in each Member 
State separately. The basic problem is that the type of Lautsi Judgment purports to 
approve, to homologate the cultures according to a logic of abstract legal person that 
is incompatible with human freedom.9
Europe, must be forced to rethink the notion of secularism that comes from Illu-
ministic age.10 Its limitation is in the abstract character – purely rational – that laicism 
has received at birth and that the Judgment Lautsi blatant cheating to an extent. The 
8  A. P a s s e r i n  d ’ E n t r e v e s, op.cit., p. 176–177.
9  S. A n d e r s e n, K.A. E l i a s s e n, The European Union: How Democratic Is It? London 1996, 
p. 98.
10  J.H.H. We i l e r, La nuova Costituzione dell’Europa, Bologna 2003, p. 139.
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Illuministic pretense of ﬁ nding a law alike in every latitude – and so universal – could 
create only discrimination.
All citizens are equal before the law without doubt and no one can be, therefore, 
discriminated against for their beliefs, religious or other nature. This principle, sol-
emnly proclaimed by our Republican Constitution and certainly intangible, requires 
us to recognize the crucial role of Christianity in the construction of our continent, 
our country up to shaping the landscape, language, social behavior, political and legal 
thought. The reality principle requires us to take note of it, with rational statement.
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